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Abstract 
The paper examines the regime of preventive detention New Zealand and 
answers the question whether the indeterminate sentence of preventive detention 
infringes the fundamental rights of dangerous offender. When confining offenders 
because of their dangerousness, the legislation must find the balance between the 
right of the community to be protected from dangerous people and the civil and 
political rights of the offender. 
The paper identifies the main human rights concerns that came up on national 
level during the period of the preparation to the New Zealand Sentencing Act 2002 
and the concerns raised by the United Nations Human Rights Committee regarding 
New Zealand's international obligations under the ICCPR. Moreover, the paper 
examines the human right issues that came up in decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada and the European Court of Human Rights concerning the prolonged 
detention of dangerous offender. 
The paper comes to the conclusion that the New Zealand regime of 
preventive detention is in compliance with the principles of double jeopardy, the 
presumption of innocence, the prohibition of retroactive law and most fair trials 
safeguards. However, section 89 (2) of the Sentencing Act 2002 infringes upon the 
right of the offender to have his or her detention reviewed as soon as the reason for 
the detainment is no longer the offence committed but the dangerousness - an aspect 
of the offender's character that might change in the future. 
Word length 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography 
and appendices) comprises approximately 13,200 words. 
2 
I INTRODUCTION 
[Jn my} opinion, the continued practice of preventive detention 
[flies} in the face of modern theories and principles of criminal 
jurisprudence. 1 
Preventive detention in New Zealand is the preventative detention of very 
dangerous offenders as sentencing option.2 As highlighted in the new Sentencing 
Act 2002, the purpose of preventive detention is "to protect the community from 
those who pose a significant and ongoing risk to the safety of its members."3 
Instead of a determinate prison sentence, offenders can be sentenced to preventive 
detention for an indeterminate period.4 The sentence of preventive detention is, 
however, only for offenders who commit violent crimes and who pose, as a result of 
their likelihood ofrecidivism, a disproportionate risk to the public.5 
The principal difficulty of preventive detention is to balance the right of the 
community to be protected from dangerous people with the civil and political rights 
of the offender. 
Preventive detention is of particular concern for New Zealand since the UN 
Human Rights Committee (hereinafter the Committee) identified preventive 
detention as major human rights concern, whereas the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
held that preventive detention does not violate the offender's human rights. The 
New Zealand Government reported about preventive detention to the Committee in 
1 Prafullachandra Natwarlal Baghwati, chairperson of the UN Human Rights Committee, during the meeting with the New Zealand Delegation on July 15 th, 2002; see UN Human Rights Committee Summa,y Record of the 20 I 6t11 meeting: New Zealand ( 15.07.2002) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.20 I 6 para 
56. 
2 Geoffrey G Hall, Stephen O'Driscoll (Presenters) Seminar: The New Sentencing and Parole Acts 
(New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 2002) 7 I; the sentence of preventive detention must be 
distinguished from the preventive detention in the sense of a pre-trial detention. Even the UN ICCPR Committee seems to have some problems to distinguish this. This terminology issue made also the research very difficult, as there is an enormous quantity of literature on "preventive detention" dealing only with pre-trial detention rather than with the sentencing of dangerous offender. 3 Sentencing Act 2002 , s 87 (1). 
4 See for the statutory requirements when a person can be sentenced to preventive detention, 
Sentencing Act 2002, ss 87-89 and in details below; the only other indeterminate incarceration is the sentence of life imprisonment in the case of murder. 
5 Mark Brown "Serious offending and the management of public risk in ew Zealand" ( 1996) 36 Brit J of Crim 18, 18. 
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its third periodic report to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(hereinafter the Covenant) in 1994. 6 In its concluding comments, the Committee was 
concerned about preventive detention and recommended that New Zealand revised 
the provisions, so that preventive detention complied with the Covenant. 7 In 1998, 
however, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held in Leitch8 that preventive detention 
does not violate the offender's human rights. 
In the fourth report from May 2001, the New Zealand Government described 
the regime of preventive detention in detail and tried to persuade the Committee that 
it did not violate the Covenant. 9 During the meeting of the New Zealand delegation 
and the Committee, the chairperson in his final comment pronounced the above-
quoted comment, indicating that the Committee still has serious concerns about the 
practice of preventive detention in New Zealand. 10 In a decision from October 2002, 
however, the Court of Appeal upheld its decision in Leitch in view of the new 
Sentencing Act 2002. 11 
This paper analyses the sentence of preventive detention in New Zealand and 
will answer the question whether it infringes the human rights of the offender. 
The paper first identifies the issues associated with preventive detention and 
dangerous offenders, and introduces three main legislation options of how to deal 
with such type of offenders. Further, it shows the concerns that were raised during 
the preparation of the Sentencing Act 2002 and presents the current provisions on 
preventive detention in New Zealand. After acknowledging the opinions of the 
Committee's members and the issues they raised during the meetings with the New 
Zealand delegation, the respective articles of the Covenant will be studied. 
Moreover, the paper examines how dangerous offenders are dealt with in Canada and 
Europe. The study of these jurisdictions will lead to the question of what New 
6 Government of New Zealand Third periodic report under Art 40 of the Covenant (30.05.1994) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/64/Add.10 para 58. 
7 Report of the Human Rights Committee to the General Assembly UN GAOR 50th Session Suppl No 
40 UN Doc A/50/40 (1995) paras 179 and 186. 
8 R v Leitch [ 1998] 1 NZLR 420 (CA), considering the provisions on preventive detention in the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985. 
9 Government of New Zealand Fourth periodic report under Art 40 of the Covenant (15 .05 .2001) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/NZL/2001/4 paras 107-125. 
10 See UN Human Rights Committee Summ(IJy Record of the 2016'" meeting: New Zealand 
(15.07.2002) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2016 (comment by Prafullachandra Natwarlal Bhagwati) para 56. 
II R v D [2003] 1 NZLR 41 (CA). 
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Zealand could learn from the human rights or due process concerns raised before the 
respective courts in regard to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The landmark decisions of the Canadian 
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights will help to evaluate the 
overall question whether preventive detention in New Zealand violates the offenders' 
basic and fundamental rights. 
II THE IDEA OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
A Identifying the Problem 
Preventive detention deals with the challenge to public safety presented by a 
minority of people, who are not mentally ill in the strictly medical sense but whose 
personality disorders pose a high risk to society. 12 
The problem in this context is that criminal law allows rarely for an 
indeterminate prison sentence for other offences than murder; 13 every other offence 
has a maximum sentence determined in the penal code after the termination of which 
the offender must be released. Additionally, indeterminate confinement in a mental 
institution under civil law is mostly only possible when the person has a recognised 
mental illness. 
Between the two spectra of people - on the one side the criminal and on the 
other side the mentally-ill - a small group of criminals can be identified to be totally 
aware of what they do, so that it is not possible to consider them as suffering from a 
mental illness, but who still pose a very high risk to the public because of their 
likelihood of recidivism and their violent deeds. Thus, the law tries to distinguish 
these violent offenders from "normal" offenders. This distinction reflects a view that 
"the public are disproportionately at risk from individuals who commit certain types 
of offences and that, in the task of risk management, government should vary its 
12 See Mark Brown "Serious offending and the management of public risk in New Zealand" (1996) 36 
Brit J of Crim 18, 18; see also Depa1tment of Health of England and Wales "Managing Dangerous 
People with Severe Personality Disorder - Proposal for Policy Development" (Home Office, London, 
l 999) 5. 
13 See for example the Crimes Act 1961 in New Zealand, Crimes Act I 961 , s 172. 
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response according to the degree of severity of harm." 14 However, every person is 
entitled to human rights and so is the criminal offender. She or he has the right to 
liberty, the right to be presumed innocent until found guilty by a court, the right not 
to be arbitrarily detained, to be punished only once for one crime and only if the law 
prohibiting his/her crime already existed at the time he/she committed it. 15 If a 
government of a state did nothing, it would infringe its general duty to protect its 
citizens from violent offenders. 
Thus, preventive detention tries to bridge the gap between the right of the 
community to be protected by the state from dangerous people and the civil and 
political rights of the offender. 
B From Treatment of Offender to Protection of Community 
The legislation on dangerous offenders can be divided into three groups. 16 
Some countries lay the uppermost importance upon the treatment of offenders; other 
countries focus on community protection. Another, earlier, approach to serious 
violent offenders can be found in the form of the 'justice model". 
I Justice Model 
The justice model was based on the assumption that the offender is a rational 
self-determining actor who deserved punishment, in contrast to the legally insane. 17 
The punishing sentence was calculated on the idea of desert and proportionality, and 
retribution and deterrence, taking into account the seriousness of the offence and the 
criminal history of the offender. However, the factor of deterrence and retribution 
could not completely outweigh the aspect of proportionality, with the result that the 
14 Mark Brown "Serious offending and the management of public risk in New Zealand" ( 1996) 36 Brit 
J of Crim 18, 18; naming this kind of policy that creates two classes of offenders a "twin track 
policy". 
15 See ICCPR, article 9 and 14; see also New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 22-26. 
16 See Michael Petrunik "Models of Dangerousness : A Cross Jurisdictional Review of Dangerousness 
Legislation and Practice" (Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1994) Part YI, online available at 
Department of the Solicitor General of Canada 
<http: "' "' "' .sgc.gc.ca/publications/correc tions/pdf 199402 e.pdl> (last accessed 26. 8.2003). 
17 Clare Connelly and Shanti Williamson "A review of the Research Literature on Serious Violent and 
Sexual Offenders" (Scottish Executive Research Unit, Edinburgh, 2000) 1.25. 
court was not allowed to impose an indeterminate sentence. 18 Despite imposing 
strict punishment and longer sentences, the justice model had one major flaw 
regarding high-risk offender: it could not give a satisfactory solution to the problem 
of offenders who had served their deserved sentence but who still posed a serious 
threat to the safety of the community. 
2 Clinical Model 
The clinical model highlights the possibility of treatment of dangerous 
offenders. Their deviant and abnormal behaviour is seen as a result of an illness, 
which is curable with medical and psychological treatment. Psychiatry is seen as 
having developed an accuracy so as to identify and treat dangerous sexual and 
violent offender. 19 The goal of such model is to prevent crime through treatment and 
rehabilitation. 20 Yet, the faith and trust in the power of medicine and psychiatry 
declined after statistics showed a high percentage of recidivism among the offenders 
who received treatments. In fact, recidivism rates of treated offenders who were 
deemed to be cured were shown to be comparable to offenders who had not been 
committed for treatment. 21 
This medical approach can still be found in some countries, but recent 
amendments in their legislation point towards a shift from offender treatment to 
community protection.22 Nevertheless, even though this shift became apparent over 
the last years, countries with a long tradition of the clinical model still have a 
therapeutic and medical emphasis in dealing with very dangerous offenders.23 
18 See Michael Petrunik "Models of Dangerousness: A Cross Jurisdictional Review of Dangerousness 
Legislation and Practice" (Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1994) part I. 
19 Andrew Horwitz "Sexual Psychopath Legislation: Is there Anywhere to Go But Backwards?" 
(1995) 57 Univ of Pittsburgh LR 35, 39. 
20 Lisa A Wilson "No Longer Free to Offend : Involuntary Civil Commitment Stah1tes for Sexual 
Predator Create the Basis for a Uniform Act" (1998) 18 North Illinois U LR 351 , 353. 
21 Horwitz, above, 45; reports, however, have begun to claim some level of success with certain types 
of sexual offenders under certain treatment conditions, see Horwitz, above, 35 Fn 54. 
22 For example in England and the Netherlands. 
23 see Michael Petrunik "Models of Dangerousness: A Cross Jurisdictional Review of Dangerousness 
Legislation and Practice" (Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1994) pa11 I. 
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3 Community Protection Model 
The community protection model is the most recent way to handle dangerous 
offenders. The Treatment of dangerous offenders is deemed to be secondary in 
comparison with public safety and the "very" dangerous offender, who poses a high 
risk on the community, should be detained indeterminately and never released. 
Two main reasons are at the origin of this model. First, the early optimism of 
dangerous offender treatment policies made way for a strong pessimism towards the 
ability of psychological and medical endeavours to treat violent and sexual offenders 
effectively. 24 And secondly, high public pressure pushed the drive for reform:25 
politicians had to react to appease the public outcry about yet another horrific offence 
committed by a recently released offender. So led the "very highly publicized and 
particularly gruesome sexual offence" of E. Shriner to the enactment of 
Washington's Sexual Predator Act;26 the case of serial rapist John Douglas Bennett 
was the reason for the extension of the scope of preventive detention in New Zealand 
in 1987.27 
Countries that adopted the community protection model can be further 
divided into two main types of legislation. In some jurisdictions, namely in the USA, 
the decision on indeterminate detention of dangerous offenders takes place following 
the service of the determinate sentence, which was based on proportionality and just 
desert. In other jurisdictions, namely Canada, some states in Australia, and in New 
Zealand, the decision of whether the offender should be incarcerated indefinitely is 
made at the point of sentencing. 
III PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN NEW ZEALAND 
This chapter presents the concerns regarding preventive detention identified 
during the preparation of the new Sentencing Act 2002 and introduces the current 
preventive detention provisions in New Zealand. 
24 Andrew Horwitz "Sexual Psychopath Legislation: Is there Anywhere to Go But Backwards?" 
(1995) 57 Univ of Pittsburgh LR 35, 47. 
25 See generally on the issue of public perception and the drive for reform Isabel Grant "Legislating 
Public Safety: The Business of Risk" (1998) 3 Canadian Criminal Law Review 177, 185. 
26 See Horwitz, above, 48 . 
27 See John Meek "The Revival of Preventive Detention in New Zealand 1986-1993" ( 1995) 28 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 1, 2. 
A The Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 
In New Zealand the sentence of preventive detention is an ongoing political 
issue and the sentence was amended several times.28 
During the preparation period to the Sentencing Act 2002, one Memorandum 
prepared for the Cabinet Policy Committee on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill 
proposed the abolition of the sentence.29 Even though the memorandum recognised 
the necessity of confining offenders beyond the sentence they received if they still 
pose a considerable risk to the community, it referred to the Penal Policy Review 
Committee in 1981, which noted that the use of preventive detention is "arbitrary, 
selective and inequitable". 30 As a replacement for the sentencing option of 
preventive detention, the memorandum proposed a new sentence whereby an 
offender convicted of a serious violent or sexual offence could be declared a 
"dangerous offender" and sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment. This 
eventually resembles the existing sentence of preventive detention in purpose, that is 
the confinement of sexual or violent offenders who are likely to commit another 
serious sexual or violent offence if released at the time their available sentence had 
expired, but had some novel procedural features, such as greater guidance to the 
court when this sentence should be imposed, greater flexibility in fixing non-parole 
periods to address better the case of the individual offender and an automatic right to 
appeal to the Court of Appeal. 31 
However, the New Zealand Government decided to keep the sentence of 
preventive detention, but to amend the legislation in several points. 
28 In the beginning the sentence of preventive detention was limited to repetitive sexual offenders and 
to offenders of at least 25 years of age. In 1987, this was extended to serious offences of violence and 
the age-threshold lowered to 21 years. The legislation was further amended in 1993 so as to comprise 
first offenders convicted for sexual violation. However, offenders of violent crimes still needed a 
prior conviction to be eligible for preventive detention. Initially, every person sentenced to preventive 
detention had there first parole hearing after having served ten years. This was made slightly more 
flexible in 1993, as the court received the power to impose a term that exceeds ten years; see for a 
comprehensive overview over the history of preventive detention John Meek "The Revival of 
Preventive Detention in New Zealand 1986-1993" (1995) 28 Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology I, 9. 
29 Memorandum prepared by Hon Phil Goff cited in G Hall and Stephen O 'Driscoll (presenters) 
Seminar: Th e New Sentencing and Parole Acts (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 2002 , 71. 
30 Hall and O 'Driscoll , above, 71. 
31 Hall and O "Driscoll, above, 7 1. 
B The Sentencing Act 2002 
The new Sentencing Act 2002 extends further the range of offenders on who 
preventive detention can be imposed. First, the age-threshold of the offender was 
reduced: the person must now be ( only) 18 years of age or over at the time 
committing the offence. 32 Second, under the new legislation, a wider range of 
offences, when committed, qualify the offender for the sentencing option of 
preventive detention ("qualifying sexual or violent offences"). 33 'Qualifying 
offences' are any sexual crime punishable by seven or more years' imprisonment 
(such as all (attempted) sexual violations, indecent assault on women or girls, incest, 
indecency),34 sexual conduct with children outside New Zealand,35 organising and 
promoting child sex tours; additionally, 'qualifying offences' include certain serious 
violent offences,36 such as attempt to murder and conspiracy to murder (murder 
entails mandatory life imprisonment anyway37),38 manslaughter,39 wounding or 
injuring with intent,40 discharging of firearm and acid throwing,41 abduction of 
woman or girl and kidnapping, and any form of robbery.42 Some members of the 
Select Committee to the Sentencing Bill wanted preventive detention available for 
those convicted of arson, but this proposal was not inserted in the final act. 43 The 
most significant amendment is finally the abolishment of the requirement for the 
offender to have a previous conviction; the sentence of preventive detention can be 
imposed on both sexual offenders and violent offenders in their first conviction. 
The expansion of the new legislation, regarding both offenders and offences, 
was counter-balanced by adjustments to the sentencing procedure and with a more 
flexible parole regime. The new legislation stipulates more stringent criteria the 
court must take into account when considering whether to impose a sentence of 
preventive detention.44 Moreover, the court may now impose a non-parole period of 
32 Sentencing Act 2002, s 87 (2) (b ). 
33 Sentencing Act 2002, s 87 (2) (a), (5). 
34 All crimes punishable by seven or more years' imprisonment under Part VII of Crimes Act 1961. 
35 Crimes Act 1961, s 144A. 
'6 , Crimes Act 1961, s 144C. 
37 Crimes Act 1961, s 172. 
38 Crimes Act 1961, s 173, 175 . 
39 Crimes Act 1961, s 181. 
4° Crimes Act 1961, ss 189 (1) and 188 respectively. 
41 Crimes Act 1961 , ss 198-199. 
42 Crimes Act 1961 , s 234, 235, 237. 
43 Geoffrey G Hall , Stephen O 'Driscoll (presenters) Seminar: The New Sentencing and Parole Acts 
(New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 2002) 72. 
44 Sentencing Act 2002, s 87 (4). 
minimum five years (instead of ten years); there is no specified maximum period of 
non-parole. 45 
IV PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND THE CRITICISM OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 
Preventive detention was not only criticised domestically but also on an 
international level. This chapter identifies on what aspects the Human Rights 
Committee criticised the sentence of preventive detention.46 Then, the paper 
examines the alleged violations of the respective articles of the Covenant and 
clarifies whether the Committee is correct with its opinion that preventive detention 
infringes human rights. 
A The Criticism of the UN Human Rights Committee 
On the list of issues to the third report to the Covenant, the Human Rights 
Committee sought "clarification of the evidence that was relevant in determining 
whether an offender was likely to repeat an offence of sexual violation, the standard 
of proof that applied and the compatibility of the provisions relating to preventive 
detention with articles 9 and 14 of the Covenant, particularly with respect to the 
· f · ,,47 presumpt10n o mnocence. Article 9 and 14 of the Covenant deal respectively 
with arbitrary arrest and detention, and the right to fair trial and due process. 
The New Zealand delegation tried to clarify the issue during the meeting with 
the Committee in May 2002; however, some Committee members still had 
considerable difficulty since "the use of the expression 'preventive detention' ... was 
unusual in that it seemed to include the possibility of imposing an added 
indeterminate sentence based on the likelihood of recidivism.',48 Accordingly, "the 
45 Sentencing Act 2002, s 89 (I) . 
46 It must be noted that the Committee could not criticise the Sentencing Act 2002 since this act was 
not yet in force. As seen above, however, the fom1er sentence of preventive detention was upheld and 
broadened in the new act, so that the Committee is likely to have even more concerns regarding the 
new legislation. 
47 See UN Human Rights Committee Summwy Record of the 1394'" meeting: New Zealand 
(07.05.1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.1394 para 19. 
48 See UN Human Rights Conunittee Summary Record of the 1394'" meeting: New Zealand 
(07 .05.1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.1394 (Comment by Mrs. Higgins) para 21. 
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purpose of imprisonment was essentially to remove persons indefinitely from 
circulation, on their initial offence."49 
In its fourth periodic report to the Covenant in 2001 before the oral session, 
the New Zealand Government tried to dissolve the concerns regarding the imposition 
of the punishment of preventive detention.50 Despite the detailed description, some 
members of the Committee were still not satisfied that the provision of the Criminal 
Justice Act 198551 dealing with 'preventive detention' was compatible with the rights 
enshrined in the Covenant. As the Committee deemed preventive detention to 
"permit punishment for possible future crimes", it was again on the list of issues for 
the consideration of New Zealand's fourth report before the Committee.52 
In addition to article 9 and 14 of the Covenant, the Committee was interested 
at some stage in the meeting with the New Zealand delegation in July 2002 whether 
preventive detention was compatible with article 15 of the Covenant dealing with the 
principle that there should be no punishment without at offence at the time when the 
offence was committed.53 Moreover, one Committee member alleged that preventive 
detention was a sort of double punishment, infringing the double jeopardy provision 
of the Covenant. 54 
In its concluding observations to the fourth periodic report of New Zealand, 
the Committee held that "with regard to the possible impact of the punishment of 
preventive detention [ upon the rights of the Covenant] ... [it] still has some concerns 
and looks forward to pursuing its dialogue with the State party further on this 
issue."55 
49 See UN Human Rights Committee Summary Record of the 1394th meeting: New Zealand 
(07.05.1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.1394 (Comment by Mrs. Higgins) para 21. 
50 Government of New Zealand Fourth periodic report under Art 40 of the Covenant (15.05.2001) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/NZL/2001 /4 paras 107-125. 
51 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 75 (repealed). 
52 See UN Human Rights Committee List of issues New Zeland (18.10.2001) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/74/L/NZL Nr. 10. 
53 See UN Human Rights Committee Summary Record of the 2016th meeting: New Zealand 
(15.07.2002) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2016 para 46. 
54 Comment by Christine Chanet, see UN Human Rights Conunittee Summa,y Record of the 20 I 5th 
meeting: New Zealand (14.01.2003) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2015 (document in French only) para 32: 
"En effet, cette mesure procede d'une appreciation de la dangerosite de !'accuse, sans qu'il soi t fait 
reference a !' infraction initiale - qui est, elle, visee par la peine principale. L'intemement de surete 
constitue ainsi une so11:e de double peine ... " 
55 UN Human Rights Conunittee Concluding Observations: New Zealand (07.08.2002) UN Doc 
CCPR/C0/75/NZL para I 0. 
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These comments demonstrate that the Human Rights Committee has 
considerable concerns regarding preventive detention. In the following, the paper 
studies whether preventive detention infringes articles 9, 14 and 15 of the Covenant. 
B Article 9 ICCPR -Liberty and Security of the Person 
The header of article 9 identifies this article as dealing generally with the 
liberty and the security of a person. Section one enshrines the right to liberty and 
security of person, the prohibition of arbitrariness and the principle of legality in case 
persons are detained. Sections two to five detail the rights for arrested or detained 
persons. They encompass the rights of the arrested person in the case of pre-trial 
detention to be informed of the reasons of arrest and of the charges against him/her, 
the right to have a court proceeding without delay, and to have the lawfulness of the 
detention examined. 
I Prohibition of arbitrariness, article 9 (I) 2 ICCPR 
The prohibition of arbitrariness is directed both at the stage of domestic 
legislation and on the stage of enforcement: not only the law itself but also its 
application by the enforcement's organs must not be arbitrary.56 The enforcement of 
the law cannot be examined here since that is a matter of the individual case and out 
of the scope of the paper. However, the paper examines whether the domestic 
legislation is arbitrary in the meaning of article 9 ( 1) 2 of the Convention. 
(a) The Penal Policy Review Committee of 1981 
The Penal Policy Review Committee in 1981, rev1ewmg the sentence of 
preventive detention, found "a number of criticisms" and observed "that there are 
indications that its use is arbitrary, selective and inequitable". 57 
56 Manfred Nowak UN. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - CCPR Commentary (Engel , Kehl, 
1993) 172. 
57 See citation ( emphasis added) in John Meek "The Revival of Preventive Detention in New Zealand 
1986-1993" ( 1995) 28 Aush·alian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology I, 22; see also Geoffrey G 
Hall, Stephen O'Driscoll (presenters) Seminar: The New Sentencing and Parole Acts (New Zealand 
Law Society, Wellington, 2002) 71. 
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The years preceding this review in 1981, preventive detention seemed to be a 
nearly forgotten sentence. The courts had imposed preventive detention just once 
between 1978 and 1981 and the sentence had even been quashed on appeal. It must 
be noted that at this time offenders were only qualified for preventive detention when 
having been committed of one sexual offence. That is one reason why the Penal 
Policy Review Committee found the use arbitrary and selective: it questioned the 
legislation on the ground that "there is no rationale for its restriction to sex 
offenders."58 The current legislation, however, is not restricted on sexual offenders 
but includes other violent criminals. 59 
The other major concern was then that the legislation instructed the Parole 
Board not to recommend release unless the prisoner was unlikely to commit further 
sexual offences. This could lead to arbitrary detention, since the Parole Board is 
evidently not a court but it had the statutory restriction ofrecommending release only 
if it believed that a detainee was unlikely to commit further offences. 
An additional concern was the fact that the Parole Board was only given the 
authority to recommend the release to the Minister of Justice, who made the final 
decision. The release from detention, and thus the deprivation of the offender's 
liberty, was in the hand of neither judges of a court nor experts of the Parole Board 
but in the hand of a politician. Politicians, however, exercise caution with regard to 
their voters' feelings and expectations, and are more reluctant to authorise release of 
a person who had been sentenced to preventive detention and was deemed a high risk 
for re-offending and consequently for society. 60 
These two major deficiencies in the legislation were already amended 
through the Criminal Justice Act 1985 and the new Sentencing Act 2002 abides these 
amendments; in particular, the parole board, instead of merely recommending the 
release, received the power to release offenders. 
58 See citation in John Meek "The Revival of Preventive Detention in New Zealand 1986-1993" 
( 1995) 28 Australian and ew Zealand Journal of Criminology 1, above, 22. 
59 See to the cunent legislation below lit (c) Sentencing Act 2002. 
60 See Meek, above, 26. 
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(b) Arbitrariness due to inconsistency and the role of the Court of Appeal 
It was observed that the sentence of preventive detention has still been 
imposed inconsistently ever since. 61 Insofar, preventive detention was criticised as 
being at the discretion of the individual judge since no statutory guidance was given 
to the court. In these circumstances, it was the Court of Appeal's role, when 
reviewing sentences of the High Court that imposed preventive detention, to 
establish guidelines to "ensure, within reasonable limits, the even-handed 
administration of justice throughout the country."62 The Court of Appeal recognised 
that when imposing the special sentence of preventive detention there "can be no 
doubt that the objective always must be equal punishment so far as it may be 
possible."63 The Court of Appeal generally has a central role in sentencing policy, 
and even though it has always a particular case to consider, it has the ability to 
establish guidelines through a consistent case law.64 Over the years the Court of 
Appeal has failed its role in this regard. Occasionally, the reasons given for 
imposing preventive detention have even been used as argument to quash the 
sentence. 65 
Yet, in 1998, the Court of Appeal tried to give some assistance and held in 
the case of Leitch that, "among other factors", the following are likely to be relevant 
when imposing preventive detention:66 
the nature of the offending, its gravity and the time span; the category of victims 
and the impact on them; the response to previous rehabilitation efforts; the time elapsed 
since any relevant previous offending and the steps taken to avoid reoffending; acceptance 
of responsibility and remorse for the victims; predilection or proclivity for offending taking 
account of professional risk assessments and the prognosis for the outcome of available 
rehabilitative treatment. 
None the less, the criticism of arbitrariness was, even after this decision, still 
valid since article 9 (1) 2 of the Covenant prohibits arbitrariness in connection with 
the national legislature itself. It is not clear whether the establishment of guidelines 
6 1 See the examples in John Meek "The Revival of Preventive Detention in New Zealand 1986-1993" 
( 1995) 28 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 1, 46-50. 
62 See R v Pawa [1978] 2 NZLR 190, 191 (CA) Richmond J for the Court. 
63 See R v Pawa, above, J 91. 
64 Meek, above, 41. 
65 Meek, above, 51 . 
66 R v Leitch [1998] 1 NZLR 420, 429 (CA) Richardson J. 
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through case law is sufficient to comply with the Covenant. The Sentencing Act 
2002, however, could have remedied this lack of statutory guidelines. 
( c) Sentencing Act 2002 
In the already mentioned memorandum prepared during the period of 
preparation to the Sentencing Act 2002, inconsistency was recognised as a major 
flaw of preventive detention. In its proposal for a new sentence, the memorandum 
pledged for "greater guidance to the court as to when this sentence should be 
imposed."67 In fact, the guidance in the Criminal Justice Act 1985, which 
incorporated the former provisions on preventive detention, was rather minimal in 
stipulating that "the High Court, if it is satisfied that it is expedient for the protection 
of the public that an offender to whom this section applies should be detained in 
custody for a substantial period, may pass a sentence of preventive detention."68 
Additionally, the High Court had to have regard to a psychiatric report and must be 
"satisfied that there is a substantial risk that the offender will commit a specified 
offence upon release."69 This, indeed, did not give any guidance for the High Court 
and could have entailed inconsistent and thus arbitrary sentences. Even though the 
recommendation of the memorandum to establish a new sentence was not adopted, 
the new Sentencing Act 2002 incorporates more stringent guidance to the courts. 
The Sentencing Act 2002 adopted the above-mentioned criteria set forth by 
the Court of Appeal in Leitch, although in other wording. Two factors of the new 
legislation should be highlighted. First, section 87 (4) of the Sentencing Act 2002 
stipulates that the Court must take the factors into account when considering whether 
to impose a sentence of preventive detention. This gives a clear indication to the 
judges that a detailed reflection on the criteria is expected in the judgment. 
Secondly, the principle of "ultima ratio", that is the principle of last resort, is now 
endorsed within the act: "a lengthy detem1inate sentence is preferable if this provides 
adequate protection for society. "70 The latest amendment has dispersed the last 
67 See Geoffrey G Hall and Stephen O'Driscoll (presenters) Seminar: The New Sentencing and Parole 
Acts (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 2002) 71. 
68 Criminal Justice Act, s 75 (2) (repealed). 
69 Criminal Justice Act, s 75 (3A) (repealed). 
70 Sentencing Act 2002, s 87 (4) (e). 
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doubts one could have had regarding the arbitrariness of the legislation. It now 
provides clear guidance of how and when to impose preventive detention. 
The sentence of preventive detention is thus not arbitrary. 
2 Other rights enshrined in article 9 ICCPR 
The principle of legality in article 9 (1) 3 of the Covenant is violated if the 
possible ground for detention is not unambiguously established in the law or the 
detention is contrary to this law. 71 The latter point is a question of the individual 
case, which is outside the scope of this paper. The former point refers to the 
legislation within the state, which is here the Sentencing Act 2002. However, the 
Sentencing Act as described above establishes clear and precise requirements when 
the sentence of preventive detention can be imposed. Hence, preventive detention 
does not infringe the principle oflegality. 
The remaining sections of article 9 encompass the rights of the arrested 
person in the case of pre-trial detention, such as to be informed of the reasons of 
arrest and of the charges against him/her. Accordingly these sections do not raise 
any issue for the sentence of preventive detention. 
Only article 9 (4) of the Covenant could pose some concerns on preventive 
detention since it stipulates that the offender has the right to have the lawfulness of 
his or her detention examined by the court. Article 9 (4) of the Covenant is nearly 
identical to article 5 (4) of the European Convention which played a prominent role 
in the European Court's assessment of preventive detention. It will accordingly be 
studied below in the light of the European Court's decisions. 
C Article 14 /CCPR-Rigltts to Fair Trial and Due Process 
Article 14 ICCPR establishes equality before the courts, the right to a fair and 
public hearing, and the minimum guarantees of the accused in criminal trials. Article 
14 will in the following only be examined under the aspects the Committee put 
71 Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - CCPR Commentmy (Engel, Kehl , 
1993) 171 , 172. 
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forward. Other due process rights enshrined in this article will be studied m 
connection to the comparison of other legislations. 
1 The presumption of innocence, Article 14 (2) ICCPR 
The presumption of innocence is an indispensable principle of fair trial.72 
The Human Rights Committee sought clarification regarding preventive detention 
from the New Zealand delegation in the light of "[article] 14 of the Covenant, 
particularly with respect to the presumption of innocence."73 
The presumption of innocence is predominant in the criminal trial since part 
of this principle is the onus of the prosecutor to prove the defendant's guilt, and not 
for the defendant to prove his or her innocence.74 After having established the 
decisive facts and argued the case, the court must in case of doubt find the accused 
not guilty pursuant to the principle of in dubio pro reo.75 Connected to this principle 
is the way and the extent by which guilt is to be proved. Generally the court must be 
convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. This requirement, 
however, was not inserted in article 14 (2) of the Covenant. Such a proposition was 
defeated during the draft of the Convention. 76 Nevertheless, it seems to be an 
undisputed principle of a criminal trial that a judge or a jury may convict an accused 
only when there is no reasonable doubt of his or her guilt and New Zealand should 
apply this widely accepted standard.77 
When considering whether to impose a sentence of preventive detention, the 
New Zealand High Court must be "satisfied that the person is likely to commit 
another qualifying sexual or violent offence if the person is released ... "78 The 
question arises what the use of the word "satisfied" exactly means, and whether 
proof beyond reasonable doubt is required. The wording of "satisfied" does not 
seem to require a proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the Court of Appeal held 
with reference to section 75 (2) Criminal Justice Act 1985 - the former provision 
72 Manfred Nowak UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - CCPR Commentary (Engel, Kehl, 
1993) 253 para 33. 
73 See UN Human Rights Committee Summa,y Record of the 1394th meeting: New Zealand 
(07.05.1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.1394 para 19. 
74 Nowak, above, 35. 
75 Nowak, above, 35. 
76 By a vote of8:2 , see Nowak, above, 35. 
77 See to the argument that this standard should be applied Nowak, above, 35. 
78 Sentencing Act 2002, s 87 (2) (c) (emphasis added). 
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relating to preventive detention - that "[t]he phrase 'is satisfied' means simply 
'makes up its mind' and is indicative of a state where the Court on the evidence 
comes to a judicial decision. There is no need or justification for adding any 
adverbial qualification ... "79 This indicates that proof beyond reasonable doubt was 
not necessary in deciding whether the person is likely to re-offend. In enacting the 
new provisions in the Sentencing Act 2002 the New Zealand Parliament can be seen 
as having approved the judgment of the Court of Appeal since the new act also uses 
the word "satisfied" without further qualification. 
Does this lead to the conclusion that "preventive detention" infringes the 
principle of the presumption of innocence because proof beyond reasonable doubt is 
not necessary? Preventive detention can be imposed only on the person being tried 
and convicted of an offence. During his or her trial the offender is presumed 
innocent. All the facts of the case have been fully established and the court is 
convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; the following 
imposition of the sentence is not a matter of proof. The presumption of innocence 
only requires judge or jury to convict the accused when there is no doubt of his or her 
guilt. And the guilt of the offender has already been established, even before the 
judge considers the sentence of preventive detention. 
Thus, article 14 (2) of the Covenant is not violated. 
2 The Prohibition of Double Jeopardy, Article 14 (7) ICCP R 
Article 14 (7) of the Covenant prohibits a person from being "tried or 
punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or 
acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country."80 
The prohibition of double jeopardy played a major role in the decision of the 
Canadian Federal Supreme Court regarding the dangerous offender order in Canada, 
and some decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. Of course, these 
judgments were delivered under different human rights instrnments but the principle 
of double jeopardy in the ICCPR or in the New Zealand Human Rights Act 1990 
79 R v White (David) [ l 988] I NZLR 264, 268 (CA) . 
80 ICCPR, art 14 (7); this is almost identical to the provision in the New Zealand Human Rights Act 
1990, s 26 (2) "No one who has been finally acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned for, an offence 
shall be tried or punished for it again". 
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ought to be the same like in Europe and Canada. Accordingly, this will best be 
assessed below, in connection with these two jurisdictions. 
D Article 15 ICCPR - Prohibition of Retroactive Criminal Law 
1 Overview 
An act can only be punishable under criminal law if the law forbids it. The 
prohibition of retroactive criminal laws is so an important right that it is non-
derogable in the Covenant and in the regional Conventions on Human Rights. 81 
In his final remarks of the meeting of the New Zealand delegation and the 
Committee in 2002, the chairperson pointed out that the "continued practice of 
preventive detention ... violated article 15 of the Covenant,"82 and another member 
wanted to know "whether preventive detention was compatible with article 15 of the 
Covenant. "83 
Article 15 stipulates that "no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence 
... which did not constitute a criminal offence ... at the time when it was committed" 
and enshrines thus the prohibition of retroactive criminal law (nulla crimen sine 
lege ). 84 Moreover, the rule against retrospective legislation forbids also the 
imposition of a penalty heavier that the one that was applicable at the time the 
offence was committed (nulla poena sine lege). 85 Both principles are so important 
rights of fair trial that they were set apart from the other rights of due process and fair 
trial in article 14 of the Covenant.86 
Unfortunately, the Human Rights Committee did not define in what way and 
to what extent the sentence of preventive detention is likely to contravene Article 15 
of the Covenant. The issue of retroactivity will therefore be scrutinised from both 
above-mentioned angles. 
81 ICCPR, art 4 (2), and in Europe and the Americas see ECHR, art 15 (2) and ACHR, art 27 (2) 
respectively. 
82 See UN Human Rights Committee Summa,y Record of the 2016th meeting: New Zealand 
(15.07.2002) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2016 para 56 (comment by Prafullachandra Natwarlal Baghwati). 
83 See UN Human Rights Committee Summary Record of the 2016th meeting: New Zealand 
(15.07.2002) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2016 para 56 (Christine Chanet). 
84 ICCPR, art 15 (1) 1. 
85 ICCPR, art 15 (1) 2. 
86 The same applies for the European and American Conventions on Human Rights, see ECHR, art 7 
and see ACHR, art 9. 
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2 Nulla crimen sine lege, article I 5 (1) I ICCPR 
Retroactivity was a key issue under the sexual offender legislation in the 
United States, which might have led the Committee to the assumption that it could be 
as well a subject of concern in New Zealand's legislation. The prohibition of 
retroactive criminal law is relevant in case the court sentences the offender to 
preventive detention under a new legislation after he or she had served his or her 
determinate sentence imposed under the old act. This is exactly the problem caused 
by the "civil" confinement legislation in the US, where the preventative detention of 
sexual offender was enacted shortly before the offenders have finished their sentence 
and long after they have been convicted of the offence. The US Supreme Court 
decided that the confinement of the offenders after their time in prison does not 
breach the prohibition of retroactive criminal laws, since the 'Sexual Predator 
Statutes' are civil, and not punitive in nature. 87 Yet, in the case of New Zealand's 
legislation, even though preventive detention is not civil in nature, this problem 
cannot occur because preventive detention is ordered by the court as sentencing 
option directly subsequent to the conviction and not at the end of the offender's 
detainment. 
3 Nulla poena sine lege, article 15 (1) 2 ICCPR 
Furthermore, the provision in the Sentencing Act 2002 could infringe article 
15 of the Covenant if the offender is punished more severe than under the old act. 88 
However, offenders are only eligible for the sentence of preventive detention since 
the act came into force. The Sentencing Act 2002 contains a transitional provision 
on the matter of how to deal with an offender convicted of a specified offence, which 
could entail preventive detention under the Criminal Justice Act 1985, committed 
before the commencement date of the new Act.89 The Sentencing Act 2002 
stipulates that the court could deal with the offender under the new Act if, "had the 
court been dealing with the offender immediately before the commencement date, 
87 Kansas v Hendricks ( 1997) 117 S Ct 2072, decision reached by 5-4 votes, see further to this issue 
Adam J Falk "Sex Offenders, Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility: The Constitutional 
Boundaries of Civil Commitment after Kansas v Hendricks" (1999) 25 Am J Law & Medicine 117. 
88 It should again be noted that the Committee could not have this issue in mind when criticising 
preventive detention because the Sentencing Act 2002 came into force after the Committee ' s final 
observations. 
89 Sentencing Act 2002, s 153. 
the court would have sentenced the offender to preventive detention under section 75 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1985."90 It means the court can only apply the new 
provision if the offender would also have been sentenced to preventive detention 
under the old legislation. As the sentence of preventive detention is in both cases 
indeterminate imprisonment, the nulla poena principle is not violated. It does not 
impose a more severe sentence on the offender than was possible at the time he or 
she committed the offence but rather the sentence was reduced in minimum terms 
from ten to five years and the system of parole eligibility was made more flexible 
under the new legislation. 
Preventive detention m New Zealand does not violate article 15 of the 
Covenant. 
E Summary 
The assertion of arbitrariness could have been a valid argument for the 
previous legislation but the coming into force of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides 
the judges of the High Court with clear guidance of when to impose preventive 
detention. Furthermore, preventive detention does not infringe the presumption of 
innocence because this principle deals with the guilt of the offender, which is, in the 
case of preventive detention, established before the judge considers the sentence of 
preventive detention. The provisions of preventive detention are moreover not 
retroactive. Therefore, no ICCPR violation and thus no human rights violation could 
be detected so far. 
In the following chapter, the survey of the legislation about 'dangerous 
offender' in Canada and Europe will tum out more areas of concern regarding 
preventive detention. In particular the principle of double jeopardy will be 
scrutinised in the light of a Canadian Supreme Court's decision. Furthermore, article 
9 (4) of the Covenant will be examined in the light of the European Court's decisions 
on the equivalent article 5 (4) of the European Convention. Only after having 
compared the legislation of preventive detention in New Zealand with the legislation 
in Canada and in Europe, and the decisions of Canadian Supreme Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights, the assessment on preventive detention and the 
rights of the offender can be completed. 
90 Sentencing Act 2002, s 153 ( 1) (b ), (2). 
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V PREVENTATIVE DETENTION OF DANGEROUS OFFENDERS IN 
CANADA AND EUROPE 
A Canada 
The current Canadian system is like the preventive detention in New Zealand 
based on community protection. Similar to other jurisdictions, the Canadian 
community protection model emerged after the treatment and the justice model for 
the management of dangerous offender was rejected. In contrast to, for example, the 
US model, the Canadian Government decided not to differentiate sexual from non-
sexual dangerous offender. Similar to New Zealand, the preventative detention for 
violent offenders is indeterminate and is determined already at the time of conviction 
and not at the end of their determinate sentence.91 
This chapter first considers the question whether the UN Committee has 
commented on the Canadian legislation. It then gives an overview on the legislative 
history and the current provisions on very dangerous offender. Further, it analyses 
the legislation in the light of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms taking 
into account the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court, which is then applied to 
the system of preventive detention in New Zealand. 
1 Comments of the United Nations Committee 
The Canadian Government mentioned its dangerous offender legislation to 
the Committee in the second report and the Committee sought some clarification 
about it. The Canadian representative referred to a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada (the Supreme Court) in which it held that the legislation is compatible with 
the guarantees in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter).92 In 
the meeting to Canada's fourth report, the Canadian delegation was again asked to 
comment on the provision of indeterminate detention of high-risk offenders and the 
Canadian representative made clear that this measure applied only to serious violent 
crimes and "was imposed only after conviction and following a special hearing to 
9 1 Consequently, the Canadian model is clearly located in the criminal system; there is no debate, like 
in the US on whether measures of detaining dangerous offender are criminal or civil in nature . 
92 Report of the Human Rights Committee to the General Assembly UN GAOR 46th Session Suppl No 
40 UN Doc A/46/40 (1991) para 68. 
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assess whether the offender showed a pattern of violent behaviour constituting a 
long-term risk to society."93 The Committee did not have further concerns and did 
not include this issue in its concluding observations. 94 
The paper scrutinises in the following the decision of the Supreme Court 
mentioned by the Canadian delegation but first gives a background to the legislation 
to facilitate the understanding of the Court's arguments. 
2 Legislative History 
Canada is an example of the three periods mentioned in the introduction of 
the paper. The dangerous offender legislation reflects a continuum from the clinical 
model, through the justice model to finally the current model of community 
protection. 95 Until 1977, the Canadian Criminal Code provided for the indeterminate 
detention of 'habitual offenders', which primarily targeted repeat property offenders 
and 'criminal sexual psychopaths' who were deemed to pose a high risk of re-
offending in the future. 96 This legislation was criticised since the habitual offender 
legislation was mainly used on property offenders and the sexual offender legislation 
did not include non-sexual offenders. Moreover, critics showed that the legislation 
was applied inconsistently, 97 which was similar to the criticism of the Cabinet Policy 
Committee in New Zealand. 
Accordingly, in 1977, the provision on habitual offenders was repealed and 
the sexual offender legislation was extended to include other dangerous violent 
offenders. 98 Pursuant to this legislation, a 'dangerous offender' was a person 
convicted of a 'serious personal injury offence' , defined either as violent offence 
punishable by at least ten years imprisonment, or all types of sexual assault offences. 
This designation had to be done through a special court hearing, held soon after the 
93 UN Human Rights Committee Summary Record of the 1738th meeting: Canada (07.03.1999) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/SR.1738 para 34 (Ms Beckton from Canadian delegation). 
94 See UN Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations to f ourth report: Canada (07.04.1999) 
UN Doc CCPR/C/79/ Add.105 . 
95 For a brief history see R vJohnson (British Columbia Court of Appeal , 2001) Carswel!BC 2128 at 
15-22 (Ryan J) . 
96 Isabel Grant "Legislating Public Safety: The Business of Risk" (1998) 3 Canadian Criminal Law 
Review 177. 
97 Clare Connelly and Shanti Williamson "A review of the Research Literature on Serious Violent and 
Sexual Offenders" (Scottish Executive Research Unit, Edinburgh, 2000) 3.10. 
98 See Correctional Service of Canada "Backgrounders - Dangerous Offenders" online available at 
<http: v\ \\ \,\ .csc-scc.gc.ca, text pube<lifeuilles ·clngoff e.sh tml> (last accessed 26.8. 2003). 
24 
offender has been convicted. In addition there had to be evidence to persuade the 
court that the offender constituted a risk to others. To assess the risk of recidivism, 
one psychiatrist could be chosen by the prosecutor, the other one by the offender. 
Once found to be a "dangerous offender", the court had discretion on whether to 
impose a determinate or an indeterminate sentence. The indeterminate sentence had 
to be reviewed after three years and every two years thereafter. One fundamental 
new feature of this regime was that the preventive and punitive part of the sentence 
merged: the former legislation kept the punitive and preventive parts of the sentence 
distinct, yet under the new legislation punitive and preventive part was not 
distinguishable. 99 
In 1995, the legislation was amended agam and stricter prov1s1ons were 
imposed after the sexual attack and murder of a young boy committed by a convicted 
psychopath who had been released. 100 An appointed joint Task Force on 'high-risk 
violent offenders' recommended key changes to the existing legislation. 101 The 
recommendations were enshrined in the Criminal Act 1985 and are in force since 
August 1, 1997. 102 
3 The Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 'R v Lyons ' 
The Supreme Court had to decide on the constitutionality of the dangerous 
offender provision in 1987. Since no case under the new legislation has yet reached 
the Supreme Court, the landmark decision in R v Lyons 103 from 1987 will be 
scrutinised and then the paper examines whether the sentence of preventive detention 
99 Isabel Grant "Legislating Public Safety: The Business of Risk" (1998) 3 Canadian Criminal Law 
Review 177, 192. 
100 Grant ,above, 218-219. 
10 1 See Correctional Service of Canada "Backgrounders - High-Risk Offenders" online available at 
<b..t!R ://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pubed/feui ll es/off-risk e.shtml> (last accessed 26.8.2003). 
102 Department of Justice Website "Bill C-55 comes into force" 
<Jmp://canada.justice.Qc.ca/en/news/nr/1997 /c55com.html> (last accessed 25.8.2003) It introduced 
five key amendments to the dangerous offender provision. First, the Bill introduced a multi-
disciplinary assessment of the offender's dangerousness. This assessment replaced the two 
psychiatrists who were nominated by Crown and Defence and thus had frequently diverging opinion, 
complicating ultimately the court's decision-making. Secondly, if having designated an offender as 
dangerous offender the court must impose an indeterminate sentence; the court's former discretion on 
this point was removed. Thirdly, the first parole review was no longer to take place after three years 
but after seven years following the sentence. Fourthly, the application process, previously to be held 
soon after conviction, could be delayed up to six months after conviction, see Isabel Grant 
"Legislating Public Safety: The Business of Risk" (1998) 3 Canadian Criminal Law Review 177, 192. 
103 R v Lyons [1987] 2 SCR 309. 
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m New Zealand meet the requirements the Court has established regarding the 
prolonged detention of dangerous offender. 
The Supreme Court of Canada considered in its decision sections 7, 9, 11 and 
12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) (the Charter). 
(a) Fundamental Justice, Article 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Section 7 of the Charter states inter aha that every person has the right to 
liberty and not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice. 
The appellant challenged the dangerous offender provision on three grounds 
of fundamental justice: the prohibition of not being punished twice for one offence, 
being punished not proportional to the guilt of the crime committed, and the want of 
a prior notification from the court that an dangerous offender order could be applied. 
The prohibition of double jeopardy is here at stake even though the Supreme 
Court did not name it expressly. The Court held unanimously104 that the section of 
the Criminal Code allowing for a dangerous offender application does not "permit an 
individual to be sentenced for crimes he or she has not committed or for crimes for 
which he or she has already been punished." 105 The Court reasoned that "the 
individual is clearly being sentenced for the 'serious personal injury offence' he or 
she has been found guilty of committing;" and only thereafter the person is 
"subjected to a procedure aimed at determining the appropriate penalty that should 
be inflicted upon him in the circumstances." 106 Moreover, the Supreme Court told 
the appellant that "the punishment ... flows from the actual commission of a specific 
crime", 107 so that the individual is not being punished for what he might do in the 
future, but for the offence he has committed. 108 
104 Wilson J (dissenting in part) held that the lack of notification of the appellant that a dangerous 
offender designation is considered, does infringe article 7 of the Charter, see below. However, he did 
not dissent on the point of double jeopardy discussed here. 
105 Submission of the appellant, see R v Lyons [1987] 2 SCR 309, 327-328. 
106 R v Lyons, above, 328 La Forest J. 
107 R v Lyons, above, 328 La Forest J. 
108 R v Lyons, above, 311 La Forest J. 
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The Supreme Court admitted that the offender is sentenced "in a different 
way than would ordinarily be done", 109 but this does not infringe section 7 of the 
Charter. Fundamental justice is not violated by the decision of Parliament to punish 
dangerous offenders not only on the "objectives of rehabilitation, deterrence and 
retribution". In the circumstance of the individual case, these objectives can be 
"greatly attenuated ... and that of prevention correspondingly increased." 110 It is not 
against fundamental justice in criminal law when Parliament decides that dangerous 
offender ought to be sentenced "not entirely based on a 'just desert' rationale" 111 
because a preventative sentence "serves both a punitive and a preventative role and 
its purpose, the protection of society, underlies the criminal law in general and 
· · · 1 ,, I I 2 sentencmg m part1cu ar. 
The Court unanimously held that the preventative detention of dangerous 
offender does not constitute a breach of the prohibition of double jeopardy, and that 
this kind of preventative detention does not infringe the principle of fundamental 
justice when taking the dangerousness of the offender into account during the 
sentencing process. 
In addition, the appellant raised another issue of fundamental justice, namely 
the issue whether his right under Article 7 of the Charter was violated because he 
was not advised of the Crown's intention to make a dangerous offender application 
before his guilty plea. 113 
Offenders might have pleaded not guilty rather than guilty to the charges 
against them, if they had been forewarned of the Crown's intention. Nevertheless, 
the majority held that it is "difficult to articulate precisely in what sense the liberty 
interests of the appellant were infringed by the absence of [prior] notice ... " 114 
However, prior notification seems not necessary since "indeed, [the dangerous 
offender provision of the Criminal Code] itself can be seen to provide notification 
that the dangerous offender provisions are invocable if 'serious personal injury 
offences' are committed by an accused." 11 5 
109 R v Lyons [1987] 2 SCR 309, 328 La Forest J. 
11 0 R v Lyons, above, 329 La Forest J. 
111 R v Lyons, above, 311 La Forest J. 
11 2 R v Lyons, above, 311 La Forest J .. 
11 3 R v Lyons, above, 370. 
114 R v Lyons, above, 371 La Forest J. 
11 5 R v Lyons, above, 372 La Forest J. 
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Wilson in his dissenting opinion argued, however, that an accused should 
know the full extent of his or her jeopardy before he pleads guilty to a criminal 
offence. 116 In his view, "[the accused] did not and could not have envisaged the 
making of the [ dangerous offender] order." 1 17 
(b) Arbitrarily Detention, Article 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Article 9 of the Charter contains the guarantee that everyone has the right not 
to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. 
Considering the term of 'arbitrarily' the Court pointed out that the legislation 
applies only to a "narrowly defined class of dangerous offenders" 118 and that the 
criteria of an application to designate someone as dangerous offender are "anything 
but arbitrary in relation to the objectives sought to be attained; they are clearly 
designed to segregate a small group of highly dangerous criminals posing threats to 
the physical or mental well-being of their victims." 119 However, the appellant argued 
that prosecutorial discretion as to whether to proceed with a dangerous offender 
application caused a lack of uniformity in the treatment of dangerous persons and 
thus the process was arbitrary. 120 The court did not follow this argument, but rather 
"completely" seconds the Crown counsel's submission that" ... it is the absence of 
the [prosecutorial] discretion which would, in many cases, render arbitrary the law's 
application." 121 
(c) Jury Trial, Article 11 (f) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Everyone charged with an offence has the right to a jury trial where the 
maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or more. 122 
The jury trial issue amounts to one key question of preventive detention, 
namely whether the application to declare the offender a dangerous offender is 
11 6 R v Lyons [1987) 2 SCR 309,379 Wilson J dissenting. 
11 7 R v Lyons, above, 381 Wilson J dissenting. 
11 8 R v Lyons, above, 312 La Forest J. 
11 9 R v Lyons, above, 347 La Forest J. 
120 R v Lyons, above, 345-346. 
12 1 R v Lyons, above, 347 La Forest J. 
122 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, art 11 (f). 
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equivalent to charging the offender with an offence. The question arises whether the 
dangerous offender provision in criminal law constitutes a genuine offence. 
The Supreme Court affirmed an earlier decision on this matter where the 
'dangerous sexual offender' application of the former legislation was under 
scrutiny. 123 It held in Wilband that the issue of such dangerous offender provision is 
"not whether he is convicted of another offence, but solely whether he is afflicted by 
a state or condition that makes him a dangerous sexual offender. .. To be so affiicted 
is not an ojfence." 124 The Court made it clear that the proceedings of habitual 
offender or dangerous sexual offender "do not involve the conviction of an offence, 
but the determination of the sentence which may be pronounced after conviction."125 
In its decision of R v Lyons, the majority of the Supreme Court upheld this 
decision in the case of the new dangerous offender legislation. 126 Yet, Lamer J in his 
dissenting opinion found that the dangerous offender provision is very different from 
sentencing provisions. 127 He held that it is not the conviction for the personal injury 
offence that gives the judge the possibility to impose an indeterminate sentence, but 
the finding of dangerousness. Moreover, the finding of dangerousness gives him 
"new jurisdiction to impose a more severe sentence, indeed a drastically more severe 
sentence." 128 Hence, the status of being a dangerous offender is "an offence for the 
purposes of article 11 (f) [of the Charter]". 129 
(d) Cruel Punishment, Article 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
Section 12 of the Charter stipulates that everyone has the right not to be 
subjected to any cruel or unusual treatment or punishment. 
The appellant contended that the indeterminate sentence under the dangerous 
offender order amounted to "a punishment that is unusually severe". 130 The Supreme 
Court recognised that there is a significant difference between the effect of a 
dangerous offender order and a determinate sentence. The convicted person in the 
latter case can "remain in a passive state, secure in the knowledge that he or she will 
123 Wi/band v The Queen [1967] SCR 14, 19-20 Fauteux J for the Court. 
124 Wilband v The Queen, above, 19 Fauteux J for the Court ( emphasis added) . 
125 Wilband v The Queen, above, 20 Fauteux J for the Court. 
126 R v Lyons [1987] 2 SCR 309,353 La Forest J. 
127 R v Lyons, above, 373 Lamer J dissenting. 
128 R v Lyons, above, 375 Lamer J dissenting. 
129 R v Lyons, above, 374 Lamer J dissenting. 
130 R v Lyons, above, 334. 
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be released thereafter;" whereas for the offender serving an indeterminate sentence, 
"the sole hope is parole". 131 Thus, to assess whether the sentence constitutes an 
unusual and cruel punishment, the availability of parole is more a key factor in the 
case of an indeterminate sentence than in a determinate one, because subsequent to 
the imposition of preventative detention parole is the "sole protection of the 
dangerous offender's liberty interests." 132 The Supreme Court concluded that the 
availability of parole ensures that the incarceration is imposed only for as long as the 
dangerousness of the offender persists. 133 
(e) Summary 
The decision of the Supreme Court demonstrates that the indeterminate 
confinement of very dangerous offender is in principle possible under the Charter, it 
does in particular not infringe upon the prohibition of double jeopardy. The 
legislation must, however, provide the offender with sufficient procedural 
safeguards. 
Preventive detention in New Zealand must, of course, not comply with the 
Canadian Charter. Nevertheless, the New Zealand Bill of Rights was modelled on 
the Canadian Charter and the white paper to the Bill of Rights noted that "[t]his will 
be of major practical importance for New Zealand lawyers and courts will be able to 
draw on the rich and developing jurisprudence from Canada." 134 Thus, it is possible 
to apply the ideas and concerns of the Supreme Court to the New Zealand legislation. 
This is even more important since the Human Rights Committee had, other than in 
the case of the New Zealand legislation, no further concerns regarding the Canadian 
provisions on dangerous offender. Should preventive detention in New Zealand 
provide the dangerous offenders with more safeguards than the Canadian legislation, 
the Committee might have gone too far in its concerning remarks. 
13 1 R v Lyons [1987] 2 SCR 309,340 La Forest J. 
132 R v Lyons, above, 341 La Forest J. 
133 R v Lyons, above, 342 La Forest J. 
134 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper Appendix to the journals of the House of 
Representatives ofNew Zealand, 0110-3407; A.6 (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985) 10.2. 
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4 Application of 'R v Lyons' on Preventive Detention in New Zealand 
Before applying the decision of the Supreme Court to the New Zealand 
system of preventive detention, the question arises whether the two regimes are at all 
comparable. 
The New Zealand legislation is in many ways analogous to the Canadian one. 
The 'serious personal injury offence' is in New Zealand similarly defined as 
'qualifying sexual or violent offence'. In both jurisdictions, dangerous offenders are 
sentenced to indeterminate imprisonment, but can be released if the parole board is 
convinced that the individual no longer represents a risk to the public. The decision 
of indeterminate sentence is moreover made directly subsequent to the conviction 
and not after the offender had served his time in prison for the index offence. These 
similarities lead to the fact that the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada should 
have some 'moral' impact on the New Zealand legislation. 
(a) Double Jeopardy 
The Supreme Court found that the dangerous offender order did not infringe 
the prohibition of the offender being convicted for an offence for which he or she has 
already been punished. Indeed, it is a standard way of sentencing to take into 
account the past convictions of a criminal when finding his or her appropriate 
sentence. 135 The sentence of preventive detention in New Zealand is not imposed on 
someone who was "picked up off the street because of his past criminality (for which 
he has already been punished)," 136 but rather the person was arrested and prosecuted 
for a violent crime. Hence, the sentence of preventive detention flows from the 
actual commission of a specific crime. 
It is true, however, that the sentence of preventive detention departs from the 
ordinary way of sentencing, since its objectives are not solely rehabilitation, 
deterrence, and retribution; these are the general objectives enshrined in the 
135 See for New Zealand the Sentencing Act 2002, s 9 (1) U). 
136 R v Lyons [1987] 2 SCR 309, 328 La Forest J. 
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Sentencing Act 2002 as "purposes of sentencing". 137 Rather, preventive detention 
accentuates the preventative purpose, that is protection of society. 138 
Connected to this - even among the judges of the Supreme Court highly 
debated - issue is the discussion of article 11 (f) of the Charter whether the offender 
should have the choice of a jury trial. In this context the majority139 of the Supreme 
Court decided that a dangerous offender order is not a separate offence that could 
trigger the right to jury trial. The court reasoned that being afflicted by a state that 
makes someone dangerous does not constitute an offence. 
This argument can be transferred to the double jeopardy issue of preventive 
detention: the offender is not being punished twice, that is for the committed offence 
and the dangerousness, because to be a dangerous offender does not entail an 
offence. The individual is punished for the offence only; the further detention is not 
based on the idea of punishment since the dangerousness does not constitute an 
offence. Hence, the taking into account of the dangerousness of the offender while 
considering the sentence does not punish the offender twice for one offence. 
Preventive detention does not violate the principle of double jeopardy. 
(b) Prior Notification 
The judges of the Supreme Court of Canada did not hold unanimously that 
the notification of the offender before his or her guilty plea is not necessary. Wilson 
in his dissenting opinion resorted to "common sense" and asked what thought is in an 
accused's mind in deciding whether or not to plead guilty. 140 He mentioned that an 
accused would ask the question: "what is the worst that can happen to me if I am 
convicted of this offence?" 141 Since orders of preventive detention are rare, Wilson 
concluded that the accused could not know that the Crown would be seeking a 
dangerous offender order against him. 142 
137 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7 (h) rehabilitation; 7 (f) deterrence and s 8 . 
138 This purpose is also mentioned in the general purposes of sentencing in the Sentencing Act 2002, s 
7 (g) but expressly repeated in the provision on preventive detention, Sentencing Act 2002, s 87 ( 1 ). 
139 However, Lamer J dissented in this point, see above. 
140 R v Lyons [1987) 2 SCR 309,379 Wilson J dissenting. 
141 R v Lyons, above, 380 Wilson J dissenting. 
142 R v Lyons, above, 380-381 Wilson J dissenting. 
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Ultimately this issue must not be resolved for the case of preventive detention 
in New Zealand, since it is a statutory requirement that "[a] sentence of preventive 
detention must not be imposed unless the offender has been notified that a sentence 
of preventive detention will be considered, and has been given sufficient time to 
b · · h ,,143 prepare su m1ss1ons on t e sentence ... This shows that the New Zealand 
legislation acknowledges this issue and sees it as essential that the offender is 
notified beforehand. In this regard the offender is better protected in New Zealand 
than in Canada. 
(c) Arbitrarily Detention 
It has been already established above that preventive detention is not 
arbitrary. Regarding the discretion of the Canadian prosecutors whether or not to 
proceed with a dangerous offender order, it is notable that, in New Zealand, the 
sentence of preventive detention can be proposed either by the prosecutor or by the 
court on its own motion. 144 This power of the court should streamline the application 
of the dangerous offender provision. The offender is thus in New Zealand better 
protected against an arbitrarily decision than in Canada. 
( d) Cruel Punishment 
The Supreme Court held that the parole process "assumes the utmost 
significance" in assessing the implication on the offender's rights in case of an 
indeterminate sentence. 145 It is the "[parole] process alone that is capable of truly 
accommodating and tailoring the sentence to fit the circumstances of the individual 
offender."146 Thus, the question when the offender will be eligible for parole is a key 
factor in regard to the offender's right to liberty. 
The Canadian provision of preventive detention was criticised by the highly 
regarded scholar Isabel Grant 147 because no fixed sentence was determined for the 
underlying serious personal injury offence, so that it was impossible to have the 
decision on when the offender could apply to the parole board determined on an 
143 Sentencing Act 2002, s 88 (I) (a). 
144 Sentencing Act 2002, s 87 (3 ). 
145 R v Lyons [1987] 2 SCR 309,341 La Forest J. 
146 R v Lyons, above, 341 La Forest J. 
147 Who was even cited in the Supreme Court's decision, see R v Lyons , above, 364. 
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individual basis. 148 None the less, the Supreme Court held that the "parole process 
save[d] the legislation from being successfully challenged."149 
In this context, it is significant that the Sentencing Act 2002 rendered the 
parole process more flexible in New Zealand than the former legislation. First, the 
minimum period of imprisonment has changed from ten to five years. Secondly, to 
reflect the two components of the - punitive and preventive - sentence the minimum 
period must be the longer of the minimum period required to reflect the gravity of the 
offence or the one required to reflect the offender's risk for society. 150 Thus, the 
decision on parole ineligibility can be taken on an individual basis, established on the 
seriousness of the crime or the dangerousness of the offender. 
5 Summary 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the preventative detention of an 
offender who poses a high risk on society does not infringe the principle of double 
jeopardy. To be constitutional, however, the system of parole is of paramount 
importance. The New Zealand legislation complies with the safeguards the Supreme 
Court held as indispensable and provides the offender with even more procedural 
protection. It is thus odd that the Human Rights Committee had concerns regarding 
the New Zealand legislation but did not deemed it as necessary to scrutinise in depth 
the "dangerous offender order" in Canada. 
B Europe 
The Supreme Court in Canada failed to clarify important issues. In 
particular, the Supreme Court did not raise the question of what power the parole 
board should be vested with to meet the right of the offender not to be detained 
longer than necessary. The European Court of Human Rights, however, had regard 
inter alia to this issue and its findings are discussed below. Moreover, the European 
Court addressed the issue put forward by Isabel Grant on whether the determination 
148 Isabel Grant "Legislating Public Safety: The Business of Risk" (1998) 3 Canadian Criminal Law 
Review 177, 226. 
149 R v Lyons [ 1987] 2 SCR 309, 34 l La Forest J. 
150 Sentencing Act 2002, s 89 (2). 
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of a fixed sentence for the underlying personal offence is indispensable to safeguard 
the human rights of the offender. 
1 Overview 
In the context of an ever-growing amalgamation and an ongoing integration 
of states into a European unity, more and more victims of human right violations file 
their complaint to the European Court of Human Rights (the European Court). 151 As 
the final decisions of the Court are binding, 152 one of the main factors in considering 
the legislation of preventive detention in Europe is the extent to which the provisions 
comply with the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). 153 
This chapter first introduces the relevant provisions of the Convention and 
then scrutinizes landmark judgments of the European Court that deal with the 
detention of dangerous offender. 
2 Relevant Provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 
The key provisions of the Convention for the purposes of the preventive 
detention of dangerous offenders are article 5 (1) (a) and 5 (4): 
5.1 Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of 
his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by 
law; 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
5.4 Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court 
and his release ordered if detention is not so lawful. 
151 The European Court of Human Rights is the supervisory body of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed 4.11.1950, entered into force 
3.9.1953, 213 UNTS 221, EIS S. 
152 See heading of European Convention on Human Rights, Art 46 and European Convention on 
Human Rights, Art 46 (1) which holds "The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final 
judgment of the Court in any case where they are parties." 
153 Department of Health of England and Wales "Managing Dangerous People with Severe 
Personality Disorder - Proposal for Policy Development" (Home Office, London, 1999) 32; Clare 
Connelly and Shanti Williamson "A review of the Research Literature on Serious Violent and Sexual 
Offenders" (Scottish Executive Research Unit, Edinburgh, 2000) 6.2. 
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Article 5 (4) of the Convention is of particular interest since it is almost identical to 
article 9 (4) of the Covenant, which is applicable to New Zealand. 
3 Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights related to the Detention of 
Dangerous Offenders 
Unlike the chapter on preventative detention of dangerous offenders in 
Canada, this chapter does not focus on a specific legislation. Thus, it remains 
unclear if the legislations in Europe on the preventative detention of dangerous 
offender are at all comparable to the preventive detention provisions in New Zealand. 
Nevertheless, the key elements of the decisions and the main concerns raised by the 
European Court can be extracted and then applied to the system of preventive 
detention in New Zealand. Where necessary some further explanations of the 
specific domestic legislation will be given, however. 
(a) Overview 
The European Court of Human Rights has generally accepted the idea of 
detaining offenders in the case they pose a significant risk to the public, even longer 
than they normally would have received for their offence. In several decisions, 
beginning in the early eighties, the European Court recognized that retribution and 
deterrence are not the only factors determining a sentence but insisted that provisions 
to protect these offenders against arbitrary and unjustified prolonged detention are in 
place. 
(b) Need for a conviction 
The following two cases deal with detention on remand. They are 
nevertheless mentioned since they confirm an essential principle of the lawfulness of 
preventative detention. The European Court held that the imprisonment of persons 
who have not yet committed an offence is not allowed only on the premises of their 
dangerousness for the public. 
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In the case of Lawless v Ireland1 54 the European Court had to decide on the 
preventative detention of a member of the Irish Republican Army. Under Irish law a 
person could be detained without trial if the Minister of the State believed that this 
person was "engaged in activities . .. prejudicial to the preservation of public peace 
and order or to the security of the State."155 The Irish Government claimed that if the 
purpose of the arrest or detention was to prevent the commission of an offence, it 
should not be necessary to have the intention of bringing the person to court. 156 The 
European Court, however, held unanimously157 that it was not acceptable to detain 
someone for a crime not yet committed, only on the assumption that the person was 
member of a terrorist organisation and might commit an offence. 158 This decision 
was confirmed in 1997, when an applicant had been imprisoned under Lithuanian 
law that permitted preventive detention when there is 159 
sufficient reasons to suspect that a person may commit a dangerous act, the elements of 
which are set out in Articles 75 [banditry] , 227-1 [criminal association] and 227-2 
[intimidation] of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and with a view to 
preventing the commission of such an act. 
The Court held that "preventive detention of the kind found in the present 
case" is violating article 5 (1) of the Convention. 160 
These two decisions highlight the fact that a person can only be detained or 
imprisoned if an offence was committed; it is not possible to detain someone who 
might commit an offence. Preventive detention in New Zealand, however, is only 
available for persons who were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of an offence; 
they are not detained for an offence they might commit in the future. 
154 Lawless v !re/and (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 1 July 1961 ) Series A No 3 
(1979-80) 1 EHRR 15. 
155 State (Amendment) Act 1940, s 4, cited in Lawless v Ireland, above, eh "As to the facts" para 12. 
156 Lawless v Ireland, above, eh "The Law" para 10. 
157 Lawless v Ireland, above, eh "The Law" para 48. 
158 Clare Ovey and Robin White Jacobs and White, Th e European Convention on Human Rights (3ed, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford , 2002) 109. 
159 Code of Criminal Procedure (Lithuania), art 50 ( 1) (in fo rce until 30 June 1997) cited in Jecius v 
Lithuania (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 31 July 2000, App 34578/97) 35. 
160 Jecius v Lithuania, above, 51. 
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( c) Arbitrariness and the requirement of a causal connection to the conviction 
In several decisions, the European Court held that if the person is found 
guilty of an offence, an indeterminate sentence on the grounds of the dangerousness 
of the offender is not arbitrary and thus permissible provided there is sufficient 
causal connection with the conviction. 
In Van Droogenbroeck, the applicant was sentenced to two years' 
imprisonment for theft and the court ordered further that he be "placed at the 
Government's disposal" for ten years because he "manifested a persistent tendency 
to crime". 161 The Government's disposal meant that he could be detained by 
executive order. The two parts of the sentence constituted under Belgian law "an 
inseparable whole". 162 After having served his two-year sentence, the applicant was 
again and again detained by administrative decision for several years on the base of 
the original sentence. 163 
The issue in the case was whether it would have been a violation of article 5 
(1) of the Convention if the detention during the ten-year period were not related to 
the initial sentence because the detention would then not occur "after conviction". 164 
The European Court held that it would be arbitrary if the detention, that was lawful at 
the outset, lost its link to the court's decision. 165 However, the Court argued that the 
there was a sufficient causal connection between the administrative decision and the 
original conviction. 
Similar to Droogenbroeck, the European Court assumed in Weeks 166 that "the 
causal link required by [Article 5 (1) (a) of the Convention] might eventually be 
broken if a position were reached in which a decision not to release or to re-detain 
was based on grounds that were inconsistent with the objectives of the sentencing 
court." 167 Mr. Weeks was sentenced to a discretionary life sentence after having 
committed, at the age of 17, a robbery in which he stole 35 pence using a started 
pistol loaded with blank cartridges. 168 This sentence was passed because the trial 
161 Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 24 June 1982) 
Series A No 50 (1982) 4 EHRR 443 para 9. 
162 See Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium, above, paras 21 and 39. 
163 Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium , above, paras 10-13. 
164 European Convention on Human Rights, art S(l)(a). 
165 Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium , above, para 40. 
166 Weeks v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 2 March 1987) Series A 
No 114 (1988) 10 EHRR 293. 
167 Weeks v United Kingdom, above, para 49. 
168 Weeks v United Kingdom , above, para 12. 
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judge declared that the applicant was "a very dangerous young man", 169 and he could 
be released on licence only when no longer a threat to community. 170 He was not 
released on licence for nearly ten years and after release recalled by the Home 
Secretary after committing minor offences. Despite the considerable time elapsed the 
Court held that the connection had not been broken.171 
In New Zealand, however, the offender is not, like in Droogenbroeck or 
Weeks, detained by an administrative decision that bases on the conviction. The 
detention for the dangerousness is rather directly connected to the conviction since 
preventive detention is a sentencing option. Thus, the causal connection of 
conviction and detention does not cause any concern in New Zealand. 
( d) Right to attend the hearing and to bring a counsel 
In Kremzow, the Court held that in a proceeding of such crucial importance 
for the applicant as the his deprivation of liberty and where his character and state of 
mind is assessed, "it was essential to the fairness of the proceedings that he be 
present during the hearing of the appeals and afforded the opportunity to participate 
in it together with his counsel."172 
The Parole Act 2002 acknowledges the necessity of procedural safeguards 
and in particular the right to attend the hearing and to bring a counsel. 173 Even if the 
Board decides to organise an unattended hearing where the offender is not present, 
the offender will have procedural safeguards, such as a review of the decision 174 and 
the right of being interviewed before the hearing with one member of the Parole 
Board in attendance of a support person. 175 
169 Quote of Trial Judge cited in Weeks v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights 
Judgment of2 March 1987) Series A No 114 (1988) JO EHRR 293, para 14. 
170 Weeks v United Kingdom , above, para 46. 
17 1 Weeks v United Kingdom , above, para 51. 
172 Kremzow v Austria (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 21 September 1993) Series A 
No 268-B (1994) 17 EHRR 322 para 67. 
173 Parole Act 2002, s 49 (3 ) (a) and (c) respectively. 
174 Parole Act 2002, s 46. 
175 Parole Act 2002, s 47 (I) and (4) respectively. 
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(e) Test of dangerousness during the period of imprisonment 
In Weeks and in Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell, the European Court raised the 
question whether the detention is unjustified if the individual's characteristics that 
lead to preventative detention, such as recidivism or dangerousness, are not tested 
before a court since these qualities are "susceptible to change over the passage of 
time." 176 
The European Court held in Weeks that if a sentence relied on facts that, ''by 
their nature, were susceptible to change in the future", "namely [the offender's] 
instability and dangerousness", the offender was entitled to have the lawfulness of 
the deprivation of liberty tested "at reasonable intervals during the course of [the 
offender's] imprisonment." 177 
The Court confirmed this judgrnent in the case of Thynne, Wilson and 
Gunnell. The applicants served each an indeterminate life sentence for sex offences; 
the domestic courts considered them "to be mentally unstable and dangerous,'' 178 and 
all applicants were sentenced to life because, "in addition to the need for punishment, 
[they were] considered by the courts to be suffering from a mental or personality 
disorder and to be dangerous and in need of treatment." 179 The discretionary life 
sentence imposed by the English courts constitutes of two distinct parts: first a "tariff 
period" that is the punitive factor to satisfy the needs for deterrence and 
retribution, 180 and second the period after the tariff that is the preventive part to 
satisfy the needs for security and protection of the community. 181 
The applicants complained inter alia a violation of article 5 (4) of the 
Convention since they were not able to have the lawfulness of their detention decided 
"by a court at reasonable intervals throughout their imprisonment" as decided in 
Weeks. 182 The European Court held again that the ongoing detention after the expiry 
of the punitive period of the life sentence is comparable to the cases of Weeks and 
Van Droogenbroeck in that the factors of unstable and dangerous behaviour is 
176 Thynne, Wilson , and Gunnell v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of25 
October 1990) Series A No 190 (199 I) 13 EHRR 666 para 80. 
177 Weeks v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of2 March 1987) Series A 
No 114 (1988) 10 EHRR 293 para 58. 
178 Thynne, Wilson , and Gunnell v United Kingdom , above, para 65. 
179 Thynne, Wilson , and Gunnell v United Kingdom , above, para 72. 
180 See Thynne, Wilson , and Gunnell v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment 
of25 October 1990) Series A No 190 (1991) 13 EHRR 666 paras 66 and 65. 
181 See Thynn e, Wilson , and Gunnell v United Kingdom, above, para 73. 
182 Thynne, Wilson , and Gunnell v United Kingdom , above, para 64. 
"susceptible to change over the passage of time and new issues of lawfulness may 
thus arise in the course of detention." 183 
In contrast to these decisions, the European Court held in Wynne 184 that not 
every sentence must be reviewed by a court. It had to consider if the findings in the 
above-mentioned cases are transferable to the mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment imposed in the case of murder. The indeterminate sentence was 
significantly different from the - also indeterminate - discretionary sentence as it is 
solely based on the grounds of the seriousness of the offence (murder) but the 
dangerousness of the offender does not play a role in the sentencing consideration. 
Thus, offenders are not eligible to have their detention reviewed on the grounds that 
their characteristics have changed over time. The original trial and appeal 
proceedings satisfy the requirements of article 5 ( 4) in the case of a mandatory life 
sentence. 
It is arguable whether the imprisonment related to the sentence of preventive 
detention in New Zealand must be tested by a competent court. The question that 
arises is whether preventive detention in New Zealand is comparable to the regime of 
a discretionary life sentence as considered in Weeks, and Thynne, Wilson and 
Gunnell or whether it resembles the case of Wynne where an offender is sentenced to 
life imprisonment and the sentence is mandatory under national law, so that a regular 
review is not necessary. 
It could be argued that the Sentencing Act 2002 makes the sentence of 
preventive detention almost mandatory: the judge is barely able to sentence the 
offender not to preventive detention if satisfied that he is a dangerous offender, thus 
it can be deduced that preventive detention is a mandatory sentence and a review not 
necessary. Yet, the Sentencing Act 2002 stipulates that "the High Court may ... 
impose a sentence of preventive detention on the offender" 185, indicating that the 
judges do not need to impose preventive detention even if the offender is deemed 
dangerous. 
183 Thy nne, Wilson , and Gunnell v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of25 
October 1990) Series A No 190 (1991) 13 EHRR 666 para 76. 
184 Wynne v United Kingdom (European Court o_f Human Rights Judgment of 18 July 1994) Series A 
No 290-A (1995) 19 EHRR 333. 
185 Sentencing Act 2002, s 87 (2) . 
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However, even if it could be concluded that preventive detention is a 
mandatory sentence as it is imposed automatically if the offender has committed a 
qualifying sexual or violent offence and the court is satisfied that the offender is 
likely to commit another offence, the consequence is not necessarily that preventive 
detention in New Zealand is similar to the provision dealt with in Wynne. 
Ultimately, it cannot be decisive whether the sentence is mandatory or not, but 
whether "the nature and purpose of that sentence are such as to require the 
lawfulness of the continued detention to be examined by a court." 186 The 
discretionary life sentence's purpose is of punitive and preventive nature; the 
preventive detention's purpose is alike. It is significant that in both sentences the 
offenders' trait, for which they are kept in prison, is their dangerousness, which may 
change in the future. Accordingly new issues of lawfulness may arise and the 
offender must have the possibility in New Zealand to have the detention reviewed. 
In New Zealand offenders can have their sentence of preventive detention 
reviewed by a parole board as soon as their minimum time of imprisonment has 
expired. 187 The question remains, however, whether the parole board is vested with 
enough power to be a "court" in the sense of article 5 ( 4) of the Convention. 
(f) What is a "court" in the sense of article 5 ( 4) of the Convention? 
The European Court had to decide what powers are required to be a "court" 
in the sense of article 5 ( 4) of the Convention. 
In Weeks, the applicant complained that he had not been able to take his case 
at reasonable intervals throughout his detention before a court as required in article 5 
( 4) of the Convention. 188 The decisive question was whether the parole board was a 
"court" within the meaning of article 5 ( 4) of the Convention. In earlier cases, the 
European Court decided that a "court" in article 5 (4) does not necessarily have to be 
a "court of law of the classic kind", 189 but it should be independent both from the 
186 See Singh v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 21 February 1996) Report 1996-I para 60 where the ECHR had to decide whether the indeterminate detention for young offenders "during her Majesty's pleasure" in the UK is mandatory and must regularly be reviewed. 187 Parole Act 2002, ss 20 (1) (a), 84 (2), Sentencing Act 2002, s 89 (l) . 188 Weeks v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 2 March 1987) Series A No 114(1988) 10EHRR293para54. . 
189 See Xv United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of24 October 1981) Series A No 46 ( 1982) 4 EHRR 188 para 53. 
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executive and the parties of the case, 190 and offer certain procedural guarantees 
"appropriate to the kind of deprivation of liberty in question." 191 Thus, there is in 
general nothing to preclude a parole board from being a "court" in the sense of article 
5 (4) of the Convention. 192 
The European Court was confronted in Weeks with the issue that the parole 
board in the UK of that time could merely advise the Home Secretary on the exercise 
of his or her power of release. 193 The 'recommendations' of the parole board were 
"without doubt purely advisory". 194 Article 5 (4) of the Convention, however, 
stipulates that the court shall "decide" on the "lawfulness of his detention" and 
"order his release" if the detention is unlawful. A purely advisory power to issue 
recommendations to a member of the executive does not satisfy the Convention's 
guarantees. The Court confirmed this finding in Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell and 
concluded again that the parole board established under UK law is not endowed with 
the power to release someone in case its dangerousness can no longer be established, 
and held that the detention of the applicants as a consequence of their dangerousness 
violated article 5 (4) of the Convention. 195 
In New Zealand, the dangerousness of the offender is, once eligible for 
parole, tested by the New Zealand Parole Board. It is an independent statutory 
body, 196 and chaired by a High Court Judge. 197 Unlike the parole boards in the 
above-mentioned judgments, the New Zealand Parole Board does not have only the 
power to recommend release but it makes the decision of when to release the 
offender and under what conditions. 198 Thus, the New Zealand Parole Board has the 
power to decide about the lawfulness of the detention and is able to order the release. 
190 Neumeister v Austria (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 27 June 1968) Series A o 8 
( 1979-80) 1 EHRR 91 chapter "The Law" para 24. 
191 De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 18 June 
1971) Series A No 12 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 373 para 76. 
192 X v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 24 October 1981) Series A 
No 46 (1982) 4 EI-IRR 188 para 61. 
193 See quotation of the respective UK act in Weeks v United Kingdom (European Court of Human 
Rights Judgment of 2 March 1987) Series A No 114 ( 1988) 10 EHRR 293 para 28. 194 Weeks v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 2 March 1987) Series A 
No 114 ( 1988) 10 EHRR 293 para 64. 
195 Thy11ne, Wilson, and Gunnell v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 2 
March 1987) Series A No 114 ( 1988) 10 EHRR 293 para 80. 
196 Parole Act 2002, s 108 ( 1 ). 
197 Parole Act 2002, s 1 12 ( 1 ). 
198 The parole board in ew Zealand (at the time not yet named New Zealand Parole Board) received 
the power to release offenders in 1985 through the Criminal Justice Act 1985, see above. 
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(g) Review at regular intervals 
In the Oldham 199 case, the European Court ruled that a two-year interval 
between reviews of detention was in general too long to be "speedy" in the meaning 
of article 5 (4) of the Convention. Whether the circumstances of this case are 
comparable to the preventive detention regime in New Zealand must ultimately not 
to be decided since the New Zealand Parole Board has to normally consider every 
offender detained in a penal institution in New Zealand "at least once every 12 
months after the offender's last parole hearing."200 One possible exemption from this 
12-month-rule is a 'postponement order' under section 27 of the Parole Act 2002 
when no significant change of the offender's circumstances are likely; this order can 
postpone a parole hearing for a maximum of three years in the case of preventive 
detention.201 Nevertheless, the offender may apply for a hearing on the grounds that 
there have been a significant change. 202 
(h) Distinction of preventive and punitive part of the sentence 
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the Convention in 
Droogenbroeck, in Weeks, and in Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell as requiring the 
sentencing court to specify which part of the sentence is punitive, representing the 
deterrence and just desert factor, and which part is preventive, representing the issue 
of mental instability or dangerousness. 203 The reason for this distinction is to enable 
the offender to have the prolonged detention, which is based on aspects of the 
offender's character that might change in the future, reviewed by an independent 
'court'. This is similar to the above-mentioned claim of Isabel Grant that there 
should be a fixed sentence determining the underlying serious personal injury 
offence. 
The New Zealand Sentencing Act 2002 seems indeed to acknowledge this 
issue when indicating that the sentencing court must order a minimum period of 
199 Oldham v United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights Judgment of 26 September 2000, 
a fop 36273/97) (2001) 31 EHRR 34. 
2 0 Parole Act 2002, s 21 (2). 
201 Parole Act 2002, s 27 (2) (a). 
202 Parole Act 2002, s 27 (3). 
203 See Clare Connelly and Shanti Williamson "A review of the Research Literature on Serious 
Violent and Sexual Offenders" (Scottish Executive Research Unit, Edinburgh, 2000) 6.11. 
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imprisonment,204 whereby this minimum period should "reflect the gravity of the 
offence".205 Had the Sentencing Act 2002 stopped there, the requirements of the 
European Court would have been met: the minimum period would have been the 
punitive part of the sentence marking the aspects of proportionality and just desert, 
and after the expiry of that minimum period the offender would be for the first time 
eligible for parole and regularly thereafter - the core requirement for the legitimacy 
of the preventive part of the sentence. 
Yet, the Sentencing Act 2002 stipulates that the mm1mum period of 
imprisonment can also be "the [period] required to reflect the purposes of the safety 
of the community in the light of the offender's age and the risk posed by the offender 
to that safety at the time of sentencing."206 If offenders receive the minimum period 
because of the risk they pose on the safety of the society, the important distinction of 
what constitutes the punitive and what the preventive part of the sentence is blurred. 
The European Court declared the necessity that their confinement must regularly be 
tested during the time offenders serve in prison because of their dangerousness to the 
public good. Under the New Zealand Sentencing Act 2002, however, the 
dangerousness of the offender is not tested when the minimum period was imposed 
not for the gravity of the crime but for the safety of society in the sense of section 89 
(2) (b). Thus, the New Zealand Sentencing Act 2002 fails the test of article 5 (4) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
4 Summary 
Preventive detention is, in the view of the European Court, a possible answer 
to the problem of dangerous offender. Similar to Canada, the uttermost importance 
is laid on the opportunity to review the dangerousness before a competent court 
because it is susceptible to change in the future. The New Zealand Parole Board is 
vested with enough power to review the sentence of the criminal regularly and to 
release him or her when no longer a risk to society. It thus complies with the 
requirements the European Court poses on a 'court'. However, the Sentencing Act 
2002 infringes article 5 (4) of the Convention and violates thus also article 9 (4) of 
204 Sentencing Act 2002, s 89 (I). 
205 Sentencing Act 2002, s 89 (2) (a). 
206 Sentencing Act 2002 , s 89 (2) (b ). 
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the Covenant because it is not clearly identifiable when the imprisonment for the 
offence ends and when the imprisonment because of the dangerousness begins. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Preventive detention tries to make a compromise between the competing 
rights of the society to be protected from very dangerous and violent offenders and 
the offenders' right to liberty and fair trial. It is out of the scope of this paper to 
address the issue of which specific articles of the Covenant guarantee the right of 
people to be protected from dangerous offender but this right is an inherent part of 
criminal law. 207 
The Supreme Court of Canada and the European Court of Human rights 
generally accept the prolonged confinement of an offender whose dangerousness 
causes a problem to the public's safety. Thus, the idea of preventive detention to 
detain the very dangerous offender indefinitely does not "[fly] in the face of modem 
theories and principles of criminal jurisprudence" as alleged by the Committee's 
chairman. It is rather expression of the community protection model that has become 
a worldwide phenomenon; and both the Canada Supreme Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights accept the general idea of preventive detention that just 
desert and proportionality are not the only factors to take into account in the 
sentence. Several safeguards, however, must be in place. 
Preventive detention in New Zealand acknowledges most of the safeguards 
set up by the Supreme Court and the European Court and goes even beyond them. 
The Parole Act 2002 endows the New Zealand Parole Board with enough power to 
release the offender when no longer deemed dangerous, an essential fact highlighted 
by several decisions of the European Court. The Sentencing Act 2002 together with 
the Parole Act 2002 also provide the offender with sufficient procedural safeguards 
to guarantee the offender fundamental fair trial rights, such as to be present at the 
hearing and to bring a counsel. 
The provision of preventive detention in New Zealand is, at least since the 
coming into force of the Sentencing Act 2002, not arbitrary. Additionally, it does not 
207 See the Canadian Supreme Court on this issue in R v Lyons [1987] 2 SCR 309, 311 La Forest J. 
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infringe the principle of the presumption of innocence because the offender' s guilt 
has been established in the usual way before the sentence is imposed. It causes 
further, unlike for example the US legislation, no concern of retroactivity. 
The arguments of the Canadian Supreme Court proved that the principle of 
double jeopardy is not at stake since the offender is punished for the crime he or she 
has committed and not what he or she might commit in the future. The 
dangerousness is taken into account only in the stage of sentencing and constitutes 
not a separate offence. 
To highlight the difference between the imprisonment for the offence and the 
confinement for the aspects of the offender's character that is susceptible to change 
in the future, the European Court demands a clear differentiation in the sentence 
itself so as to enable offenders to have their detention reviewed by a competent court 
as soon as the punitive time in prison is over. This claim is based on article 5 (4) of 
the European Convention, which is almost identical to article 9 ( 4) of the Covenant. 
Unfortunately, section 89 (2) of the Sentencing Act 2002 opens the possibility for the 
New Zealand High Court to set the minimum time for imprisonment not only on the 
gravity of the offence but also on the period needed to protect the public from the 
risk posed by the offender. This blurs the line drawn by the European Court that the 
offender's dangerousness is likely to change with the time, and must thus be 
reviewed as soon as his or her confinement in relation to his or her dangerousness 
begins. 
Preventive detention thus violates the fair trial right of the offender enshrined 
in article 9 (4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Section 
89 of the Sentencing Act 2002 should be amended so that the minimum period can 
only be set in regard to the gravity of the offence - representing the punitive part of 
the sentence 
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